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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-10-04 14:48:27 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-10-04 14:48:27 -0700
commita3443cda5588985a2724d6d0f4a5f04e625be6eb (patch)
treee6ce34ee3f8a887906f3a589dd9d2d2fc516953b
parent3cd013ab79e8e5c58fbd50fc09fceb6260a92a68 (diff)
parent1306d8e1c09fdc8ecb9ef235e2116352f810f9c5 (diff)
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: SELinux/LSM: - overlayfs support, necessary for container filesystems LSM: - finally remove the kernel_module_from_file hook Smack: - treat signal delivery as an 'append' operation TPM: - lots of bugfixes & updates Audit: - new audit data type: LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (47 commits) Revert "tpm/tpm_crb: implement tpm crb idle state" Revert "tmp/tpm_crb: fix Intel PTT hw bug during idle state" Revert "tpm/tpm_crb: open code the crb_init into acpi_add" Revert "tmp/tpm_crb: implement runtime pm for tpm_crb" lsm,audit,selinux: Introduce a new audit data type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE tmp/tpm_crb: implement runtime pm for tpm_crb tpm/tpm_crb: open code the crb_init into acpi_add tmp/tpm_crb: fix Intel PTT hw bug during idle state tpm/tpm_crb: implement tpm crb idle state tpm: add check for minimum buffer size in tpm_transmit() tpm: constify TPM 1.x header structures tpm/tpm_crb: fix the over 80 characters checkpatch warring tpm/tpm_crb: drop useless cpu_to_le32 when writing to registers tpm/tpm_crb: cache cmd_size register value. tmp/tpm_crb: drop include to platform_device tpm/tpm_tis: remove unused itpm variable tpm_crb: fix incorrect values of cmdReady and goIdle bits tpm_crb: refine the naming of constants tpm_crb: remove wmb()'s tpm_crb: fix crb_req_canceled behavior ...
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c84
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c4
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h46
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c121
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c50
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c24
-rw-r--r--fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c22
-rw-r--r--fs/overlayfs/dir.c10
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_audit.h2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/lsm_hooks.h37
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h25
-rw-r--r--security/lsm_audit.c17
-rw-r--r--security/security.c27
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Kconfig38
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c106
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c12
-rw-r--r--security/smack/Kconfig12
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack.h10
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c14
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_netfilter.c4
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c11
26 files changed, 436 insertions, 253 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c
index c2ee304..6f060c7 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/st33zp24/st33zp24.c
@@ -589,8 +589,6 @@ int st33zp24_probe(void *phy_id, const struct st33zp24_phy_ops *ops,
chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_IRQ;
disable_irq_nosync(tpm_dev->irq);
-
- tpm_gen_interrupt(chip);
}
return tpm_chip_register(chip);
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
index f5d4521..912ad30 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-dev.c
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static ssize_t tpm_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
return -EPIPE;
}
out_size = tpm_transmit(priv->chip, priv->data_buffer,
- sizeof(priv->data_buffer));
+ sizeof(priv->data_buffer), 0);
tpm_put_ops(priv->chip);
if (out_size < 0) {
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
index 1abe2d7..8de6187 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-interface.c
@@ -330,13 +330,16 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_calc_ordinal_duration);
/*
* Internal kernel interface to transmit TPM commands
*/
-ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
- size_t bufsiz)
+ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
ssize_t rc;
u32 count, ordinal;
unsigned long stop;
+ if (bufsiz < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (bufsiz > TPM_BUFSIZE)
bufsiz = TPM_BUFSIZE;
@@ -350,7 +353,8 @@ ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
return -E2BIG;
}
- mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+ if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED))
+ mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
rc = chip->ops->send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count);
if (rc < 0) {
@@ -393,20 +397,21 @@ out_recv:
dev_err(&chip->dev,
"tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
out:
- mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+ if (!(flags & TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED))
+ mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
return rc;
}
#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
#define TPM_RET_CODE_IDX 6
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd,
- int len, const char *desc)
+ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *cmd,
+ int len, unsigned int flags, const char *desc)
{
- struct tpm_output_header *header;
+ const struct tpm_output_header *header;
int err;
- len = tpm_transmit(chip, (u8 *) cmd, len);
+ len = tpm_transmit(chip, (const u8 *)cmd, len, flags);
if (len < 0)
return len;
else if (len < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
@@ -453,26 +458,13 @@ ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = subcap_id;
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, desc);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
+ desc);
if (!rc)
*cap = tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap;
return rc;
}
-
-void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
- struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
- ssize_t rc;
-
- tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
- tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
-
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
- "attempting to determine the timeouts");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_gen_interrupt);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_getcap);
#define TPM_ORD_STARTUP cpu_to_be32(153)
#define TPM_ST_CLEAR cpu_to_be16(1)
@@ -490,7 +482,7 @@ static int tpm_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be16 startup_type)
start_cmd.header.in = tpm_startup_header;
start_cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = startup_type;
- return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &start_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &start_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
"attempting to start the TPM");
}
@@ -521,7 +513,8 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
+ NULL);
if (rc == TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT) {
/* The TPM is not started, we are the first to talk to it.
@@ -535,7 +528,7 @@ int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
- NULL);
+ 0, NULL);
}
if (rc) {
dev_err(&chip->dev,
@@ -596,7 +589,7 @@ duration:
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
"attempting to determine the durations");
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -633,7 +626,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_timeouts);
#define TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST 83
#define CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE 10
-static struct tpm_input_header continue_selftest_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header continue_selftest_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
.ordinal = cpu_to_be32(TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST),
@@ -652,14 +645,14 @@ static int tpm_continue_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
cmd.header.in = continue_selftest_header;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, CONTINUE_SELFTEST_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
"continue selftest");
return rc;
}
#define TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD cpu_to_be32(21)
#define READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 30
-static struct tpm_input_header pcrread_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header pcrread_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
.ordinal = TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD
@@ -672,7 +665,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_read_dev(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
"attempting to read a pcr value");
if (rc == 0)
@@ -745,7 +738,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
*/
#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
#define EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 34
-static struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
.length = cpu_to_be32(34),
.ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND
@@ -770,7 +763,7 @@ int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
tpm_put_ops(chip);
@@ -792,7 +785,7 @@ int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
unsigned int loops;
unsigned int delay_msec = 100;
unsigned long duration;
- struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+ u8 dummy[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
duration = tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, TPM_ORD_CONTINUE_SELFTEST);
@@ -807,9 +800,8 @@ int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
do {
/* Attempt to read a PCR value */
- cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
- cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(0);
- rc = tpm_transmit(chip, (u8 *) &cmd, READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE);
+ rc = tpm_pcr_read_dev(chip, 0, dummy);
+
/* Some buggy TPMs will not respond to tpm_tis_ready() for
* around 300ms while the self test is ongoing, keep trying
* until the self test duration expires. */
@@ -824,7 +816,6 @@ int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
return -EFAULT;
- rc = be32_to_cpu(cmd.header.out.return_code);
if (rc == TPM_ERR_DISABLED || rc == TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED) {
dev_info(&chip->dev,
"TPM is disabled/deactivated (0x%X)\n", rc);
@@ -879,7 +870,7 @@ int tpm_send(u32 chip_num, void *cmd, size_t buflen)
if (chip == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, "attempting tpm_cmd");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, cmd, buflen, 0, "attempting tpm_cmd");
tpm_put_ops(chip);
return rc;
@@ -949,7 +940,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(wait_for_tpm_stat);
#define TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE cpu_to_be32(152)
#define SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE 10
-static struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header savestate_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
.length = cpu_to_be32(10),
.ordinal = TPM_ORD_SAVESTATE
@@ -981,14 +972,15 @@ int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev)
cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(tpm_suspend_pcr);
memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, dummy_hash,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, EXTEND_PCR_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
"extending dummy pcr before suspend");
}
/* now do the actual savestate */
for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
cmd.header.in = savestate_header;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE, NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, SAVESTATE_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
+ NULL);
/*
* If the TPM indicates that it is too busy to respond to
@@ -1032,7 +1024,7 @@ int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *dev)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pm_resume);
#define TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE 18
-static struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getrandom_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
.length = cpu_to_be32(14),
.ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_RANDOM
@@ -1072,8 +1064,8 @@ int tpm_get_random(u32 chip_num, u8 *out, size_t max)
tpm_cmd.params.getrandom_in.num_bytes = cpu_to_be32(num_bytes);
err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd,
- TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
- "attempting get random");
+ TPM_GETRANDOM_RESULT_SIZE + num_bytes,
+ 0, "attempting get random");
if (err)
break;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
index b46cf70..a76ab4a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314
#define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK cpu_to_be32(124)
-static struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
+static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
.tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
.length = cpu_to_be32(30),
.ordinal = TPM_ORD_READPUBEK
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ static ssize_t pubek_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
struct tpm_chip *chip = to_tpm_chip(dev);
tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header;
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
+ err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE, 0,
"attempting to read the PUBEK");
if (err)
goto out;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 3e32d5b..4d183c9 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -476,32 +476,35 @@ extern dev_t tpm_devt;
extern const struct file_operations tpm_fops;
extern struct idr dev_nums_idr;
+enum tpm_transmit_flags {
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED = BIT(0),
+};
+
+ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+ unsigned int flags);
+ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, const void *cmd, int len,
+ unsigned int flags, const char *desc);
ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
const char *desc);
-ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
- size_t bufsiz);
-ssize_t tpm_transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, void *cmd, int len,
- const char *desc);
-extern int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *);
-extern void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *);
+int tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *);
int tpm1_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-extern int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *);
-extern unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *, u32);
-extern int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *);
-extern int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *);
-extern int wait_for_tpm_stat(struct tpm_chip *, u8, unsigned long,
- wait_queue_head_t *, bool);
+int tpm_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+unsigned long tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
+int tpm_pm_suspend(struct device *dev);
+int tpm_pm_resume(struct device *dev);
+int wait_for_tpm_stat(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 mask, unsigned long timeout,
+ wait_queue_head_t *queue, bool check_cancel);
struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num);
__must_check int tpm_try_get_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
void tpm_put_ops(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-extern struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev,
- const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
-extern struct tpm_chip *tpmm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
- const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
-extern int tpm_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-extern void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *dev,
+ const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
+struct tpm_chip *tpmm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev,
+ const struct tpm_class_ops *ops);
+int tpm_chip_register(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip);
void tpm_sysfs_add_device(struct tpm_chip *chip);
@@ -528,8 +531,7 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id,
u32 *value, const char *desc);
int tpm2_auto_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-extern void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type);
-extern unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *, u32);
-extern int tpm2_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip);
-extern int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
+void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type);
+unsigned long tpm2_calc_ordinal_duration(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 ordinal);
+int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip);
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
index 0c75c3f..7df55d5 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
sizeof(cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select));
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[pcr_idx >> 3] = 1 << (pcr_idx & 0x7);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0,
"attempting to read a pcr value");
if (rc == 0) {
buf = cmd.params.pcrread_out.digest;
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash_alg = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ALG_SHA1);
memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0,
"attempting extend a PCR value");
return rc;
@@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *out, size_t max)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_getrandom_header;
cmd.params.getrandom_in.size = cpu_to_be16(num_bytes);
- err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ err = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0,
"attempting get random");
if (err)
break;
@@ -434,12 +434,12 @@ static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
}
/**
- * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal a trusted key
- * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
- * @options: authentication values and other options
+ * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
* @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
*
- * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success.
+ * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success.
*/
int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "sealing data");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, 0, "sealing data");
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -538,10 +538,18 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-static int tpm2_load(struct tpm_chip *chip,
- struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
- struct trusted_key_options *options,
- u32 *blob_handle)
+/**
+ * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd
+ */
+static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+ struct trusted_key_options *options,
+ u32 *blob_handle, unsigned int flags)
{
struct tpm_buf buf;
unsigned int private_len;
@@ -576,7 +584,7 @@ static int tpm2_load(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "loading blob");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, flags, "loading blob");
if (!rc)
*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
@@ -590,7 +598,16 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-static void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
+/**
+ * tpm2_flush_context_cmd() - execute a TPM2_FlushContext command
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd
+ */
+static void tpm2_flush_context_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle,
+ unsigned int flags)
{
struct tpm_buf buf;
int rc;
@@ -604,7 +621,8 @@ static void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, handle);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "flushing context");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, flags,
+ "flushing context");
if (rc)
dev_warn(&chip->dev, "0x%08x was not flushed, rc=%d\n", handle,
rc);
@@ -612,10 +630,18 @@ static void tpm2_flush_context(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle)
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
}
-static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip,
- struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
- struct trusted_key_options *options,
- u32 blob_handle)
+/**
+ * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
+ * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
+ *
+ * Return: same as with tpm_transmit_cmd
+ */
+static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
+ struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
+ struct trusted_key_options *options,
+ u32 blob_handle, unsigned int flags)
{
struct tpm_buf buf;
u16 data_len;
@@ -635,7 +661,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip,
options->blobauth /* hmac */,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, "unsealing");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, buf.data, PAGE_SIZE, flags, "unsealing");
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EPERM;
@@ -654,12 +680,12 @@ static int tpm2_unseal(struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
/**
- * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal a trusted key
- * @chip_num: A specific chip number for the request or TPM_ANY_NUM
- * @options: authentication values and other options
+ * tpm_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key
+ * @chip_num: TPM chip to use
* @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form
+ * @options: authentication values and other options
*
- * Returns < 0 on error and 0 on success.
+ * Return: < 0 on error and 0 on success.
*/
int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_payload *payload,
@@ -668,14 +694,17 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 blob_handle;
int rc;
- rc = tpm2_load(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
+ rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle,
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- rc = tpm2_unseal(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
-
- tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+ goto out;
+ rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle,
+ TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+ tpm2_flush_context_cmd(chip, blob_handle, TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
return rc;
}
@@ -701,12 +730,13 @@ ssize_t tpm2_get_tpm_pt(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 property_id, u32 *value,
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_id = cpu_to_be32(property_id);
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), desc);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, desc);
if (!rc)
*value = be32_to_cpu(cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_out.value);
return rc;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_get_tpm_pt);
#define TPM2_STARTUP_IN_SIZE \
(sizeof(struct tpm_input_header) + \
@@ -735,7 +765,7 @@ static int tpm2_startup(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 startup_type)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_startup_header;
cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = cpu_to_be16(startup_type);
- return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd),
+ return tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0,
"attempting to start the TPM");
}
@@ -763,7 +793,7 @@ void tpm2_shutdown(struct tpm_chip *chip, u16 shutdown_type)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_shutdown_header;
cmd.params.startup_in.startup_type = cpu_to_be16(shutdown_type);
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), "stopping the TPM");
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, "stopping the TPM");
/* In places where shutdown command is sent there's no much we can do
* except print the error code on a system failure.
@@ -828,7 +858,7 @@ static int tpm2_start_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip, bool full)
cmd.header.in = tpm2_selftest_header;
cmd.params.selftest_in.full_test = full;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, TPM2_SELF_TEST_IN_SIZE, 0,
"continue selftest");
/* At least some prototype chips seem to give RC_TESTING error
@@ -880,7 +910,7 @@ static int tpm2_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[1] = 0x00;
cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_select[2] = 0x00;
- rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, (u8 *) &cmd, sizeof(cmd), NULL);
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, NULL);
if (rc < 0)
break;
@@ -895,23 +925,6 @@ static int tpm2_do_selftest(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
/**
- * tpm2_gen_interrupt() - generate an interrupt
- * @chip: TPM chip to use
- *
- * 0 is returned when the operation is successful. If a negative number is
- * returned it remarks a POSIX error code. If a positive number is returned
- * it remarks a TPM error.
- */
-int tpm2_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
-{
- u32 dummy;
-
- return tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, 0x100, &dummy,
- "attempting to generate an interrupt");
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_gen_interrupt);
-
-/**
* tpm2_probe() - probe TPM 2.0
* @chip: TPM chip to use
*
@@ -928,11 +941,9 @@ int tpm2_probe(struct tpm_chip *chip)
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_id = cpu_to_be32(0x100);
cmd.params.get_tpm_pt_in.property_cnt = cpu_to_be32(1);
- rc = tpm_transmit(chip, (const char *) &cmd, sizeof(cmd));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), 0, NULL);
if (rc < 0)
return rc;
- else if (rc < TPM_HEADER_SIZE)
- return -EFAULT;
if (be16_to_cpu(cmd.header.out.tag) == TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS)
chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
index 018c3825..a7c870a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_crb.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/platform_device.h>
#include "tpm.h"
#define ACPI_SIG_TPM2 "TPM2"
@@ -34,14 +33,14 @@ enum crb_defaults {
CRB_ACPI_START_INDEX = 1,
};
-enum crb_ca_request {
- CRB_CA_REQ_GO_IDLE = BIT(0),
- CRB_CA_REQ_CMD_READY = BIT(1),
+enum crb_ctrl_req {
+ CRB_CTRL_REQ_CMD_READY = BIT(0),
+ CRB_CTRL_REQ_GO_IDLE = BIT(1),
};
-enum crb_ca_status {
- CRB_CA_STS_ERROR = BIT(0),
- CRB_CA_STS_TPM_IDLE = BIT(1),
+enum crb_ctrl_sts {
+ CRB_CTRL_STS_ERROR = BIT(0),
+ CRB_CTRL_STS_TPM_IDLE = BIT(1),
};
enum crb_start {
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ struct crb_control_area {
} __packed;
enum crb_status {
- CRB_STS_COMPLETE = BIT(0),
+ CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE = BIT(0),
};
enum crb_flags {
@@ -81,6 +80,7 @@ struct crb_priv {
struct crb_control_area __iomem *cca;
u8 __iomem *cmd;
u8 __iomem *rsp;
+ u32 cmd_size;
};
static SIMPLE_DEV_PM_OPS(crb_pm, tpm_pm_suspend, tpm_pm_resume);
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ static u8 crb_status(struct tpm_chip *chip)
if ((ioread32(&priv->cca->start) & CRB_START_INVOKE) !=
CRB_START_INVOKE)
- sts |= CRB_STS_COMPLETE;
+ sts |= CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE;
return sts;
}
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ static int crb_recv(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t count)
if (count < 6)
return -EIO;
- if (ioread32(&priv->cca->sts) & CRB_CA_STS_ERROR)
+ if (ioread32(&priv->cca->sts) & CRB_CTRL_STS_ERROR)
return -EIO;
memcpy_fromio(buf, priv->rsp, 6);
@@ -142,11 +142,14 @@ static int crb_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
struct crb_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
int rc = 0;
- if (len > ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size)) {
- dev_err(&chip->dev,
- "invalid command count value %x %zx\n",
- (unsigned int) len,
- (size_t) ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
+ /* Zero the cancel register so that the next command will not get
+ * canceled.
+ */
+ iowrite32(0, &priv->cca->cancel);
+
+ if (len > priv->cmd_size) {
+ dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid command count value %zd %d\n",
+ len, priv->cmd_size);
return -E2BIG;
}
@@ -156,7 +159,7 @@ static int crb_send(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *buf, size_t len)
wmb();
if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_CRB_START)
- iowrite32(cpu_to_le32(CRB_START_INVOKE), &priv->cca->start);
+ iowrite32(CRB_START_INVOKE, &priv->cca->start);
if (priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START)
rc = crb_do_acpi_start(chip);
@@ -168,15 +171,10 @@ static void crb_cancel(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
struct crb_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(&chip->dev);
- iowrite32(cpu_to_le32(CRB_CANCEL_INVOKE), &priv->cca->cancel);
-
- /* Make sure that cmd is populated before issuing cancel. */
- wmb();
+ iowrite32(CRB_CANCEL_INVOKE, &priv->cca->cancel);
if ((priv->flags & CRB_FL_ACPI_START) && crb_do_acpi_start(chip))
dev_err(&chip->dev, "ACPI Start failed\n");
-
- iowrite32(0, &priv->cca->cancel);
}
static bool crb_req_canceled(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 status)
@@ -194,8 +192,8 @@ static const struct tpm_class_ops tpm_crb = {
.send = crb_send,
.cancel = crb_cancel,
.req_canceled = crb_req_canceled,
- .req_complete_mask = CRB_STS_COMPLETE,
- .req_complete_val = CRB_STS_COMPLETE,
+ .req_complete_mask = CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE,
+ .req_complete_val = CRB_DRV_STS_COMPLETE,
};
static int crb_init(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv)
@@ -265,8 +263,7 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
acpi_dev_free_resource_list(&resources);
if (resource_type(&io_res) != IORESOURCE_MEM) {
- dev_err(dev,
- FW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table does not define a memory resource\n");
+ dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "TPM2 ACPI table does not define a memory resource\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -302,6 +299,7 @@ static int crb_map_io(struct acpi_device *device, struct crb_priv *priv,
dev_err(dev, FW_BUG "overlapping command and response buffer sizes are not identical");
return -EINVAL;
}
+ priv->cmd_size = cmd_size;
priv->rsp = priv->cmd;
return 0;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
index d66f51b..e3bf31b 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c
@@ -440,7 +440,6 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xf1
};
size_t len = sizeof(cmd_getticks);
- bool itpm;
u16 vendor;
rc = tpm_tis_read16(priv, TPM_DID_VID(0), &vendor);
@@ -451,8 +450,6 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
if (vendor != TPM_VID_INTEL)
return 0;
- itpm = false;
-
rc = tpm_tis_send_data(chip, cmd_getticks, len);
if (rc == 0)
goto out;
@@ -460,8 +457,6 @@ static int probe_itpm(struct tpm_chip *chip)
tpm_tis_ready(chip);
release_locality(chip, priv->locality, 0);
- itpm = true;
-
rc = tpm_tis_send_data(chip, cmd_getticks, len);
if (rc == 0) {
dev_info(&chip->dev, "Detected an iTPM.\n");
@@ -526,6 +521,18 @@ static irqreturn_t tis_int_handler(int dummy, void *dev_id)
return IRQ_HANDLED;
}
+static int tpm_tis_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
+{
+ const char *desc = "attempting to generate an interrupt";
+ u32 cap2;
+ cap_t cap;
+
+ if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
+ return tpm2_get_tpm_pt(chip, 0x100, &cap2, desc);
+ else
+ return tpm_getcap(chip, TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT, &cap, desc);
+}
+
/* Register the IRQ and issue a command that will cause an interrupt. If an
* irq is seen then leave the chip setup for IRQ operation, otherwise reverse
* everything and leave in polling mode. Returns 0 on success.
@@ -575,10 +582,9 @@ static int tpm_tis_probe_irq_single(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 intmask,
/* Generate an interrupt by having the core call through to
* tpm_tis_send
*/
- if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2)
- tpm2_gen_interrupt(chip);
- else
- tpm_gen_interrupt(chip);
+ rc = tpm_tis_gen_interrupt(chip);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
/* tpm_tis_send will either confirm the interrupt is working or it
* will call disable_irq which undoes all of the above.
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 43fdc27..db37a0e 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -105,6 +105,13 @@ retry:
goto retry;
}
+ error = security_inode_copy_up_xattr(name);
+ if (error < 0 && error != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ break;
+ if (error == 1) {
+ error = 0;
+ continue; /* Discard */
+ }
error = vfs_setxattr(new, name, value, size, 0);
if (error)
break;
@@ -248,6 +255,8 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
struct dentry *upper = NULL;
umode_t mode = stat->mode;
int err;
+ const struct cred *old_creds = NULL;
+ struct cred *new_creds = NULL;
newdentry = ovl_lookup_temp(workdir, dentry);
err = PTR_ERR(newdentry);
@@ -260,10 +269,23 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_locked(struct dentry *workdir, struct dentry *upperdir,
if (IS_ERR(upper))
goto out1;
+ err = security_inode_copy_up(dentry, &new_creds);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out2;
+
+ if (new_creds)
+ old_creds = override_creds(new_creds);
+
/* Can't properly set mode on creation because of the umask */
stat->mode &= S_IFMT;
err = ovl_create_real(wdir, newdentry, stat, link, NULL, true);
stat->mode = mode;
+
+ if (new_creds) {
+ revert_creds(old_creds);
+ put_cred(new_creds);
+ }
+
if (err)
goto out2;
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
index 1560fdc..b0ffa1d 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
@@ -489,6 +489,15 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
if (override_cred) {
override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
+ if (!hardlink) {
+ err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry,
+ stat->mode, &dentry->d_name, old_cred,
+ override_cred);
+ if (err) {
+ put_cred(override_cred);
+ goto out_revert_creds;
+ }
+ }
put_cred(override_creds(override_cred));
put_cred(override_cred);
@@ -499,6 +508,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, stat,
link, hardlink);
}
+out_revert_creds:
revert_creds(old_cred);
if (!err) {
struct inode *realinode = d_inode(ovl_dentry_upper(dentry));
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index ffb9c9d..e58e577 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE 9
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY 10
#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP 11
+#define LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE 12
union {
struct path path;
struct dentry *dentry;
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ struct common_audit_data {
#endif
char *kmod_name;
struct lsm_ioctlop_audit *op;
+ struct file *file;
} u;
/* this union contains LSM specific data */
union {
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 101bf19..558adfa 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -151,6 +151,16 @@
* @name name of the last path component used to create file
* @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
* @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
+ * @dentry_create_files_as:
+ * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
+ * and set that context in passed in creds so that new files are
+ * created using that context. Context is calculated using the
+ * passed in creds and not the creds of the caller.
+ * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
+ * @mode mode used to determine resource type.
+ * @name name of the last path component used to create file
+ * @old creds which should be used for context calculation
+ * @new creds to modify
*
*
* Security hooks for inode operations.
@@ -401,6 +411,23 @@
* @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
* @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
* In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * @inode_copy_up:
+ * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of
+ * overlay filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds
+ * and modify as need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to
+ * new creds temporarily to create new file and release newly allocated
+ * creds.
+ * @src indicates the union dentry of file that is being copied up.
+ * @new pointer to pointer to return newly allocated creds.
+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error.
+ * @inode_copy_up_xattr:
+ * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied
+ * up from a lower layer to the union/overlay layer.
+ * @name indicates the name of the xattr.
+ * Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP if
+ * security module does not know about attribute or a negative error code
+ * to abort the copy up. Note that the caller is responsible for reading
+ * and writing the xattrs as this hook is merely a filter.
*
* Security hooks for file operations
*
@@ -1358,6 +1385,10 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen);
+ int (*dentry_create_files_as)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ struct cred *new);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
@@ -1425,6 +1456,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
size_t buffer_size);
void (*inode_getsecid)(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+ int (*inode_copy_up)(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
+ int (*inode_copy_up_xattr)(const char *name);
int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
@@ -1455,7 +1488,6 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
- int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
int (*kernel_read_file)(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int (*kernel_post_read_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -1656,6 +1688,7 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head sb_clone_mnt_opts;
struct list_head sb_parse_opts_str;
struct list_head dentry_init_security;
+ struct list_head dentry_create_files_as;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
struct list_head path_unlink;
struct list_head path_mkdir;
@@ -1696,6 +1729,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads {
struct list_head inode_setsecurity;
struct list_head inode_listsecurity;
struct list_head inode_getsecid;
+ struct list_head inode_copy_up;
+ struct list_head inode_copy_up_xattr;
struct list_head file_permission;
struct list_head file_alloc_security;
struct list_head file_free_security;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 7831cd5..c2125e9 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -242,6 +242,10 @@ int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen);
+int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ struct cred *new);
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
@@ -282,6 +286,8 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buf
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new);
+int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name);
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask);
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file);
void security_file_free(struct file *file);
@@ -307,7 +313,6 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
-int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file);
int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id);
int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
enum kernel_read_file_id id);
@@ -598,6 +603,14 @@ static inline int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry,
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
+static inline int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode, struct qstr *name,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ struct cred *new)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
struct inode *dir,
@@ -758,6 +771,16 @@ static inline void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
*secid = 0;
}
+static inline int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 45d927a..37f04da 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(struct sk_buff *skb,
}
return ret;
}
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
/**
* ipv6_skb_to_auditdata : fill auditdata from skb
* @skb : the skb
@@ -245,6 +245,19 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
}
break;
}
+ case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE: {
+ struct inode *inode;
+
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " path=", &a->u.file->f_path);
+
+ inode = file_inode(a->u.file);
+ if (inode) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP: {
struct inode *inode;
@@ -257,7 +270,7 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
}
- audit_log_format(ab, " ioctlcmd=%hx", a->u.op->cmd);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ioctlcmd=0x%hx", a->u.op->cmd);
break;
}
case LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY: {
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 4838e7f..f825304 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -364,6 +364,15 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
+int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name,
+ const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode,
+ name, old, new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as);
+
int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr,
const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
@@ -748,6 +757,18 @@ void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
}
+int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up);
+
+int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up_xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP, name);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr);
+
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
int ret;
@@ -1623,6 +1644,8 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_parse_opts_str),
.dentry_init_security =
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security),
+ .dentry_create_files_as =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_create_files_as),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
.path_unlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_unlink),
.path_mkdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mkdir),
@@ -1684,6 +1707,10 @@ struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listsecurity),
.inode_getsecid =
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid),
+ .inode_copy_up =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up),
+ .inode_copy_up_xattr =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr),
.file_permission =
LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission),
.file_alloc_security =
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 8691e92..ea7e3ef 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -93,41 +93,3 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
via /selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
-
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
- bool "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version"
- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
- default n
- help
- This option enables the maximum policy format version supported
- by SELinux to be set to a particular value. This value is reported
- to userspace via /selinux/policyvers and used at policy load time.
- It can be adjusted downward to support legacy userland (init) that
- does not correctly handle kernels that support newer policy versions.
-
- Examples:
- For the Fedora Core 3 or 4 Linux distributions, enable this option
- and set the value via the next option. For Fedora Core 5 and later,
- do not enable this option.
-
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
-config SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
- int "NSA SELinux maximum supported policy format version value"
- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
- range 15 23
- default 19
- help
- This option sets the value for the maximum policy format version
- supported by SELinux.
-
- Examples:
- For Fedora Core 3, use 18.
- For Fedora Core 4, use 19.
-
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, look for the
- policy format version supported by your policy toolchain, by
- running 'checkpolicy -V'. Or look at what policy you have
- installed under /etc/selinux/$SELINUXTYPE/policy, where
- SELINUXTYPE is defined in your /etc/selinux/config.
-
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 13185a6..2205ea2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1761,8 +1761,8 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
{
struct common_audit_data ad;
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
- ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
}
@@ -1784,8 +1784,8 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
int rc;
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
- ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
@@ -1808,13 +1808,13 @@ out:
/*
* Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
*/
-static int selinux_determine_inode_label(struct inode *dir,
- const struct qstr *name,
- u16 tclass,
- u32 *_new_isid)
+static int
+selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
+ struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
+ u32 *_new_isid)
{
const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
- const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
(sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
@@ -1857,8 +1857,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
- &newsid);
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(), dir,
+ &dentry->d_name, tclass, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -2365,8 +2365,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
}
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
- ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = bprm->file;
if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
@@ -2838,7 +2838,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
u32 newsid;
int rc;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
+ d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
&newsid);
if (rc)
@@ -2847,6 +2848,27 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
}
+static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name,
+ const struct cred *old,
+ struct cred *new)
+{
+ u32 newsid;
+ int rc;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(old->security,
+ d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
+ inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
+ &newsid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ tsec = new->security;
+ tsec->create_sid = newsid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr,
const char **name,
@@ -2863,7 +2885,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(
+ rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(current_security(),
dir, qstr,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
@@ -3293,6 +3315,41 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
*secid = isec->sid;
}
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
+{
+ u32 sid;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec;
+ struct cred *new_creds = *new;
+
+ if (new_creds == NULL) {
+ new_creds = prepare_creds();
+ if (!new_creds)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ tsec = new_creds->security;
+ /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
+ selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
+ tsec->create_sid = sid;
+ *new = new_creds;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+ /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
+ * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
+ * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
+ return 1; /* Discard */
+ /*
+ * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
+ * by selinux.
+ */
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
/* file security operations */
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
@@ -3776,8 +3833,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
/* finit_module */
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
- ad.u.path = file->f_path;
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
fsec = file->f_security;
if (sid != fsec->sid) {
@@ -3984,7 +4041,7 @@ out:
return ret;
}
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -4075,7 +4132,7 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
&ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
goto okay;
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case PF_INET6:
ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
if (ret)
@@ -5029,7 +5086,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
}
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state)
@@ -5087,7 +5144,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
}
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state)
@@ -5273,7 +5330,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
}
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nf_hook_state *state)
@@ -6062,6 +6119,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
@@ -6088,6 +6146,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
@@ -6317,7 +6377,7 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
{
.hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 38feb55..308a286 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -39,11 +39,7 @@
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX_VALUE
-#else
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL
-#endif
/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
#define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 456e1a9..34afead 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -242,6 +242,8 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
goto err;
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1)))
+ goto err;
rc = -ENOMEM;
key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 894b6cd..7d10e5d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -374,6 +374,9 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
goto ok;
}
+ if (e->highbit && !count)
+ goto bad;
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
rc = next_entry(&startbit, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc < 0) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 992a315..ace6838 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -541,21 +541,21 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->class_val_to_struct =
- kmalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)),
+ kzalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->role_val_to_struct =
- kmalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
+ kzalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
p->user_val_to_struct =
- kmalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
+ kzalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
goto out;
@@ -964,7 +964,7 @@ int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
* Role must be authorized for the type.
*/
role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
- if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
+ if (!role || !ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
/* role may not be associated with type */
return 0;
@@ -1094,6 +1094,9 @@ static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
int rc;
char *str;
+ if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags);
if (!str)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -2414,6 +2417,7 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
} else
tr->tclass = p->process_class;
+ rc = -EINVAL;
if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, tr->role) ||
!policydb_type_isvalid(p, tr->type) ||
!policydb_class_isvalid(p, tr->tclass) ||
diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig
index 271adae..923b120 100644
--- a/security/smack/Kconfig
+++ b/security/smack/Kconfig
@@ -40,3 +40,15 @@ config SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
This enables security marking of network packets using
Smack labels.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SMACK_APPEND_SIGNALS
+ bool "Treat delivering signals as an append operation"
+ depends on SECURITY_SMACK
+ default n
+ help
+ Sending a signal has been treated as a write operation to the
+ receiving process. If this option is selected, the delivery
+ will be an append operation instead. This makes it possible
+ to differentiate between delivering a network packet and
+ delivering a signal in the Smack rules.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 26e58f1..51fd301 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -256,6 +256,16 @@ enum {
#define MAY_LOCK 0x00002000 /* Locks should be writes, but ... */
#define MAY_BRINGUP 0x00004000 /* Report use of this rule */
+/*
+ * The policy for delivering signals is configurable.
+ * It is usually "write", but can be "append".
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_APPEND_SIGNALS
+#define MAY_DELIVER MAY_APPEND /* Signal delivery requires append */
+#else
+#define MAY_DELIVER MAY_WRITE /* Signal delivery requires write */
+#endif
+
#define SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW 1 /* Allow bringup mode */
#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT 2 /* Allow unconfined label */
#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT 3 /* Allow unconfined label */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 87a9741..caec225 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1857,14 +1857,14 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
skp = file->f_security;
- rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
- rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
rc = 0;
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
- smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
+ smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
return rc;
}
@@ -2265,8 +2265,8 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
* can write the receiver.
*/
if (secid == 0) {
- rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
- rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
return rc;
}
/*
@@ -2275,8 +2275,8 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
* we can't take privilege into account.
*/
skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
- rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
- rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
index aa6bf1b..205b785 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
#include <net/inet_sock.h>
#include "smack.h"
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops smack_nf_ops[] = {
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
-#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
{
.hook = smack_ipv6_output,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index e249a66..6492fe9 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2523,14 +2523,9 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (count == 0 || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
return -EINVAL;
- data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (data == NULL)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
- rc = -EFAULT;
- goto out_data;
- }
+ data = memdup_user(buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return PTR_ERR(data);
cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count);
if (IS_ERR(cp)) {